Verify the requester before approving
Check the DApp domain, contract address, network, token and purpose so an unfamiliar page does not receive permission for an unknown contract. Approval risk comes from the permission granted to a contract and how long it remains useful; even a familiar DApp should not make a new approval automatic. For “Verify the requester before approving,” first identify whether the relevant fact belongs to the local wallet interface, the selected network, or a contract permission. That distinction prevents an interface message from being mistaken for a final on-chain result.
Stop when a party demands remote control, verification codes, a seed phrase or private key, or promises asset recovery in exchange for credentials or signatures. Legitimate support does not need wallet secrets. In the context of “Verify the requester before approving,” use a consistent order: establish the account and network, inspect the specific address, contract or request parameters, and only then authorize an action that can move assets or create permissions. After a suspicious event, stop new signatures and transfers, preserve verifiable facts such as transaction hashes, domains and contract addresses, then review approvals and the device environment before taking further action.
The goal for “Verify the requester before approving” is to reduce exposure: do not transmit recovery material online, do not grant remote-control access to strangers, and do not let urgency bypass review. After a suspicious signature, inspect the account, approvals, transactions and device environment separately.
- Keep seed phrases and private keys offline and private
- Never send recovery material or verification codes
- Review transfers and signatures item by item
- Stop new transfers and approvals after suspicious activity
Common mistakes and a better sequence
If “Verify the requester before approving” behaves differently from expected, record the active network, account, requester and any transaction hash, then eliminate possible causes one at a time. Do not keep signing, approving or sending assets merely to repair an issue that has not yet been identified.
Read the permission scope and amount
An approval can be limited or broad, and the requested scope should not be ignored when the intended action only requires limited access. Approval risk comes from the permission granted to a contract and how long it remains useful; even a familiar DApp should not make a new approval automatic. For “Read the permission scope and amount,” first identify whether the relevant fact belongs to the local wallet interface, the selected network, or a contract permission. That distinction prevents an interface message from being mistaken for a final on-chain result.
A useful security model covers the entire path from credentials and device state to website identity, request details and the final on-chain result. Protecting only one layer leaves other attack surfaces unexamined. In the context of “Read the permission scope and amount,” use a consistent order: establish the account and network, inspect the specific address, contract or request parameters, and only then authorize an action that can move assets or create permissions. A useful security model covers the entire path from credentials and device state to website identity, request details and the final on-chain result. Protecting only one layer leaves other attack surfaces unexamined.
The goal for “Read the permission scope and amount” is to reduce exposure: do not transmit recovery material online, do not grant remote-control access to strangers, and do not let urgency bypass review. After a suspicious signature, inspect the account, approvals, transactions and device environment separately.
- Keep seed phrases and private keys offline and private
- Never send recovery material or verification codes
- Review transfers and signatures item by item
- Stop new transfers and approvals after suspicious activity
Common mistakes and a better sequence
If “Read the permission scope and amount” behaves differently from expected, record the active network, account, requester and any transaction hash, then eliminate possible causes one at a time. Do not keep signing, approving or sending assets merely to repair an issue that has not yet been identified.
Connected does not mean trusted forever
A DApp connection establishes an interaction context, while every approval request still deserves an independent decision, especially repeated prompts unrelated to the intended action. Approval risk comes from the permission granted to a contract and how long it remains useful; even a familiar DApp should not make a new approval automatic. For “Connected does not mean trusted forever,” first identify whether the relevant fact belongs to the local wallet interface, the selected network, or a contract permission. That distinction prevents an interface message from being mistaken for a final on-chain result.
After a suspicious event, stop new signatures and transfers, preserve verifiable facts such as transaction hashes, domains and contract addresses, then review approvals and the device environment before taking further action. In the context of “Connected does not mean trusted forever,” use a consistent order: establish the account and network, inspect the specific address, contract or request parameters, and only then authorize an action that can move assets or create permissions. A useful security model covers the entire path from credentials and device state to website identity, request details and the final on-chain result. Protecting only one layer leaves other attack surfaces unexamined.
The goal for “Connected does not mean trusted forever” is to reduce exposure: do not transmit recovery material online, do not grant remote-control access to strangers, and do not let urgency bypass review. After a suspicious signature, inspect the account, approvals, transactions and device environment separately.
- Keep seed phrases and private keys offline and private
- Never send recovery material or verification codes
- Review transfers and signatures item by item
- Stop new transfers and approvals after suspicious activity
A pre-confirmation review
If “Connected does not mean trusted forever” behaves differently from expected, record the active network, account, requester and any transaction hash, then eliminate possible causes one at a time. Do not keep signing, approving or sending assets merely to repair an issue that has not yet been identified.
How to handle permissions you no longer use
Review active permissions periodically, verify the network and spender, and then decide whether to revoke; disconnecting a website is not the same as revoking an on-chain approval. Approval risk comes from the permission granted to a contract and how long it remains useful; even a familiar DApp should not make a new approval automatic. For “How to handle permissions you no longer use,” first identify whether the relevant fact belongs to the local wallet interface, the selected network, or a contract permission. That distinction prevents an interface message from being mistaken for a final on-chain result.
After a suspicious event, stop new signatures and transfers, preserve verifiable facts such as transaction hashes, domains and contract addresses, then review approvals and the device environment before taking further action. In the context of “How to handle permissions you no longer use,” use a consistent order: establish the account and network, inspect the specific address, contract or request parameters, and only then authorize an action that can move assets or create permissions. A useful security model covers the entire path from credentials and device state to website identity, request details and the final on-chain result. Protecting only one layer leaves other attack surfaces unexamined.
The goal for “How to handle permissions you no longer use” is to reduce exposure: do not transmit recovery material online, do not grant remote-control access to strangers, and do not let urgency bypass review. After a suspicious signature, inspect the account, approvals, transactions and device environment separately.
- Keep seed phrases and private keys offline and private
- Never send recovery material or verification codes
- Review transfers and signatures item by item
- Stop new transfers and approvals after suspicious activity
Common mistakes and a better sequence
If “How to handle permissions you no longer use” behaves differently from expected, record the active network, account, requester and any transaction hash, then eliminate possible causes one at a time. Do not keep signing, approving or sending assets merely to repair an issue that has not yet been identified.